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Suppose you have a nite support of incomes and 14 equally spaced incomes
which cover this whole support. If you ask subjects to assign these 14 in-
comes to seven categories ranging from \very bad" to \excellent", you will
expect them to assign precisely two neighboring incomes in increasing order
to the respective categories. Yet, this picture changes dramatically when
these equally spaced income stimuli are embedded in sets of adventitious
or background income stimuli which serve to create dierent income distri-
butions. The background context causes subjects to rate the same income
stimulus higher if there are only few higher incomes in the respective income
distribution and lower if there are many incomes ahead of the considered
income in the respective income distribution. Thus, income categorization
and, a fortiori, income satisfaction, depend on the background context.
When subjects are asked to categorize incomes, they seem to step into
the shoes of the income recipients and categorize the respective incomes with
respect to relative deprivation. Although context dependence of categoriza-
tion was widely investigated in psychology, it has, to the best of our knowl-
edge, never been systematically studied with respect to the satisfaction with
and the categorization of incomes. This is perhaps due to the prevalence of
positively{skewed income distributions in virtually all societies. However, it
is tempting to examine the eects of relative deprivation of other shapes of
income distributions and compare the results. For a given aggregate income
in an economy this implies that dierent patterns of income distributions en-
gender dierent welfare eects. The present paper canvasses context eects
of ve dierent shapes of income distributions.
This paper is organized as follows: Section 2 informs succinctly on re-
search on context dependence, Section 3 presents a short survey on range{
1frequency theory, Section 4 describes the experiment, Section 5 discusses its
results, and Section 6 concludes. The instructions and the stimulus material
of the experiment have been relegated to the Appendix.
2 Context Dependence: A Succinct Appraisal
Parducci (1968, p. 84) observed that acts of wrongdoing are rated more
leniently in a context of rather nasty behavior than in a context of mild mis-
behavior. Experimental research by Birnbaum (1973, 1974b), too, evidenced
that subjects tend to judge persons by their worst bad deed.
Birnbaum et al. (1971) presented subjects lines of dierent length. They
found that the eects of any particular line upon the judgment of average
length varied inversely with the length of the other lines within the same set.
Birnbaum (1974a) investigated subjects' perceptions of the magnitude of
numerals. He observed that the categorization of 45 to 47 numerals ranging
from 108 to 992 depended decisively on the shape of their distributional
arrangement. Birnbaum (1992) found that certainty equivalents of binary
lotteries are rated higher when associated with negatively{skewed than with
positively{skewed distributions of proposals.
Parducci (1982) observed that subjects' categorization of squares of dif-
ferent size depended decisively on the skewness of the distribution according
to which the dierently sized squares were presented. In a similar experi-
ment, Mellers and Birnbaum (1982) found that the members of identical sets
of squares were assigned to higher categories of darkness (expressed as the
number of dots contained in a square) when their presentation was embed-
ded in a positively{skewed dot distribution of other squares than when it was
embedded in a negatively{skewed dot distribution.
2Notice that these ndings, although related to, go beyond mere anchoring
eects1 and simple context eects2. They establish a relationship between the
shape of the distribution of the presented stimuli and subjects' judgments
on a categorial scale. Strong contextual eects exist for category ratings.
Parducci (1982) has characterized such eects as a constituent of human
behavior:
I would have little interest in subjects' expressions of value experiences
if these did not change with context. A particular income that might
have seemed magnicent at an early stage in one's career would seem
totally inadequate at a later stage. If a response scale did not reect
this change, it would miss the all important decline in experienced
value. (p. 90)
Closer inspection shows that categorization of stimuli depends not only
on the shape of the distribution of the stimuli but also on their range. It
diers also for closed sets of categories and open{ended categories.
While Luce and Galanter (1963, p. 268) had deplored the lack of a so-
phisticated theory of category judgments which denes a scale of sensation
that is invariant under experimental manipulations, Parducci and associates,
upon having noticed that subjects' evaluation and categorization of objects
depended on their background context, set to work to develop such a theory,
to wit, range{frequency theory. It was developed from Parducci's (1965) li-
1Anchoring has been studied by Hunt and Volkmann (1937), Rogers (1941), McGarvey
(1942/43), Helson (1947). For more recent work compare, for example, Tversky 1974,
p. 154; Tversky and Kahneman 1974, p. 1128; Quattrone et al. 1984; Northcraft and
Neale 1987; Green et al. 1995; Jacowitz and Kahneman 1995.
2See, for example, Glaeser and Sacerdote (2000) for sentences for crimes which increase
if the victim is considered as \more valuable" or if the oender is considered as \less
valuable".
3men model and has proved to reveal important insights into category rating
(Parducci 1968, 1974, 1982; Parducci et al. 1960; Parducci and Perret 1971;
Birnbaum 1973, 1974a, 1974b, 1992; Birnbaum et al. 1971; Mellers 1982,
1986; Mellers and Birnbaum 1982). This theory takes into account that the
distribution of stimuli in which they are embedded matters for the evaluation
and categorization of the very same objects.
3 Range-Frequency Theory: A Short Survey
Range{frequency theory captures the dependence of category assignments on
the distribution and the range of stimuli. It comprises equations for the range
value, the frequency value, for judgment, and for the category assignment
(Parducci 1982, pp. 94{5).
The range value Ri of stimulus Si depends on the value of this stimulus





The frequency value Fi of stimulus Si depends on the rank of this stimulus,





The judgment of stimulus i, Ji, is modelled as a weighted mean of the range
value and the frequency value:
Ji := wRi + (1   w)Fi; 0  w  1: (3)
The category assignment of stimulus i, Ci, is then the simple transformation:
Ci := bJi + a; (4)
4where b denotes the range of possible categories and a the rank assigned to
the lowest category, in most cases: 1. Thus, category assignment assumes
that categories are equally spaced; adjoining categories dier precisely by 1.
For w = 0 only the frequency value matters, that is, the same number of
stimuli is assigned to each category in increasing order. For instance, if there
were seven categories, then the seventh one of lowest{ranked stimuli would
be assigned to the lowest category, and so on.
For w = 1 only the range value matters, that is, the range of the stimuli
is equally split. Stimuli are assigned to categories according to the limens of
the equally{wide intervals of the range of the stimuli. This means that, if
Si is placed in another context with the same minimum value but a higher
maximum value of the stimuli, then Si tends to fall back in judgment and
categorization. On the other hand, if the minimum of the stimuli decreases
while their maximum remains unchanged, Si tends to advance in judgment
and categorization.
Range{frequency theory considers categorization to be a weighted aver-
age of these two components. Thus, it posits that categorization is linear
both in stimulus value (range component) and in stimulus rank (frequency
component). Arranging stimuli on the abscissa and categories on the ordi-
nate should produce a nonlinear graph if w > 0 and if the distribution of
stimuli is not uniform. Nonlinearity of this graph is caused solely by the
assumption of linearity of categorization in stimulus rank (frequency compo-
nent). Psychologists sometimes estimated w = 0:45 (Parducci et al. 1960,
p. 74) or w = 0:475 (Birnbaum 1974a, p. 92), sometimes they just adopted
w = 0:5 (for example, Parducci and Perrett 1971, p. 429).
Tests of range{frequency theory use sundry distributions of stimuli, for
example, uniform, symmetrical unimodal, symmetrical bimodal, positively{
5skewed and negatively{skewed distributions. The respective distributions
are generated either by appropriate spacing and/or appropriate frequency of
stimuli (see, for example, Parducci 1965, 1974; Parducci and Perrett 1971),
or by embedding a set of (usually equally spaced) stimuli into a superset
of adventitious stimuli (see, for example, Mellers 1982, 1986; Mellers and
Birnbaum 1982; Parducci 1982) which shape the intended distribution.
For all distributions of stimuli the judgment function becomes steeper
where the stimuli are more densely packed. Thus, if the subsets of equally
spaced stimuli (which are common to all distributions) are arranged on the
abscissa and the mean categorial value on the ordinate, symmetric uni-
modal distributions produce an S{shaped curve, bimodal distributions pro-
duce an ogival{shaped curve, positively{skewed distributions produce a con-
cave curve, and negatively{skewed distributions a convex curve, where the
curve of positively{skewed distributions lies above the curve of negatively{
skewed distributions. The distance between curves is greater the less cate-
gories are admitted. Moreover, subjects tend to exhaust the available cat-
egories. If the set of stimuli is truncated, all categories are nevertheless
occupied, although relatively more tenuously.
Range{frequency theory has been successfully employed by Mellers (1982,
1986) for the investigation of equity judgments such as equitable salaries or
equitable taxation as functions of merit. Mellers winnowed out the \Aris-
totelian" subjects, that is, those, whose responses conformed with propor-
tionality. For the rest, she placed merit ratings on the abscissa and mean
salaries on the ordinate, and received precisely the pattern described in the
preceding paragraph (Mellers 1982, pp. 259{261; 1986, pp. 82{86).
In an attempt to rescue his linear equity model (Harris 1976, 1980), Har-
ris (1993) transformed Mellers' merit stimuli to yearly salaries, used these as
6stimuli, and observed a linear relationship between his stimuli and the equi-
table salaries. However, when using Mellers' merit design proper as stimuli,
he found Mellers' results conrmed. Thus, he concluded that stimulus dimen-
sion, too, matters for subjects' behavioral conformity with range{frequency
theory. Note, however, that Harris' treatment contains an element of equi-
table redistribution of a given salary structure, which is dierent from a
primordial assignment of salaries according to merit.
4 The Experiment
4.1 Aims and Scope
This paper pursues four aims. Firstly, we examine whether background con-
text matters. In other words, we canvass how the categorization of the same
set of stimuli systematically depends on the background context. Indeed, cat-
egorization of incomes using dierent distributions of stimuli has never been
studied thoroughly. Mellers and Harris examined the judgment of equitable
salaries, not income categorization based on dierent income distributions.
Secondly, we investigate relative deprivation by way of income categoriza-
tion.3 When subjects categorize incomes, they cannot wholly avoid stepping
into the shoes of the income recipients whose incomes they are asked to judge.
Thus, they feel relative deprivation of an income position if many incomes
3Relative deprivation was introduced by Stouer et al. (1949), and further elaborated
by Runciman (1966). Similar ideas were developed by philosopher Temkin (1986, 1993).
Temkin suggests that inequality aversion results from the complaints of income recipients
in the low income echelons akin to relative deprivation. In an experimental investigation
of the Temkin theory, Devooght (2002) found particular support for the dependence of
complaints on the weighted sum of the gaps of incomes in excess of mean income and of
mean income.
7are encountered which are ahead of this income (likewise, they may feel \rel-
ative elation" if the particular income gures among the higher income strata
within the income distribution).
Thirdly, we investigate whether range{frequency theory is a valid de-
scription of the categorization of incomes. Moreover, we focus on the proper
weights of the range and frequency components, an issue which has been
understudied in earlier research. After deriving the weights of the range
and frequency components, we will investigate which income distribution
generates most happiness both in terms of personal income satisfaction and
aggregate well{being.
Finally, the present study investigates also the reverse side of income
categorization, to wit, the production of the limens of income categories.
In particular, we check whether the structure of the limens matches income
categorization.4 If the limens of income categories depend on the distribution
of the presented stimuli, then utility functions of income estimated from such
data cannot but reect the respective pattern.5
4It seems that only Birnbaum (1974a) had paid attention to the reverse side of income
categorization. Instead of asking subjects for the limens of income categories, he asked his
subjects for their judgments of their typical numbers for each category.
5For instance, the Leyden school has ventured to estimate utility functions or individual
welfare functions of income from data of limens of income categories. Cf., e.g., van Praag
(1968, 1971), van Praag and Kapteyn (1973), van Herwaarden et al. (1977), Kapteyn
and van Herwaarden (1980), van Herwaarden and Kapteyn (1981). For a criticism of
the Leyden approach cf. Seidl (1994). The present paper oers another explanation of
the lognormal hypothesis of the Leyden utility function of income, to wit, that it is a
reection of income categorization stemming from everyday experience with positively{
skewed income distributions. In a seminal study, Birnbaum (1974a) reconciled range{
frequency theory with the existence of a psychophysical function which is indeed invariant
with respect to background context eects. In the realm of income, this function is but
a utility function of income. In this view, the lognormal utility function emerges as a
84.2 The Experimental Design
The experiment was computerized and told subjects a cover story of the
income distribution on a planet called Utopia, inhabited by small green in-
dividuals with the UFO as the local currency (see the Appendix). This
extraterrestrial story was employed to distort as much as possible any conno-
tation with the extant positively{skewed income distributions and, thereby,
provide an unbiased test of context dependence of categorization. For this
purpose, we chose a support of 100 and 1,000 UFOs for all income distri-
butions and used Italian subjects who were at the time of the experiment
accustomed to a completely dierent dimension of currency units.
Insert Table 1 about here.
For our experiment, we used ve distributions, which were truncated to
secure the required nite support: uniform, normal, bimodal (mixture of two
normal distributions), positively{skewed (lognormal), and negatively{skewed
(negative lognormal). To generate the experimental design, we used the
parameters stated in the second and third columns of Table 1. In a rst step,
we computed the respective truncated distribution functions, divided their
range (the unit interval) by 43 and computed the projection of these equally
spaced values on the support (the 100{1,000 interval), which produced the
mathematical bases of our stimuli.
In order to be able to compare a subset of identical stimuli across the ve
manifestation of a unique utility function of income which owes its particular shape to the
positively{skewed appearance of empirical income distributions.
9experimental designs, we formed a sequence of 14 equally spaced values,6
which were embedded in 28 adventitious income values which provided the
background context of the respective experimental distributions. To accom-
plish that, we replaced the nearest values in the mathematical bases of the
distributions by the values of the equally spaced subsets of stimuli, which
formed our experimental design. The mathematical bases and the experi-
mental values of our stimuli are presented in Table A1 in the Appendix. The
subsets of identical stimuli across all experimental stimulus distributions are
shown in boldface. The right side of Table 1 provides mean, standard devi-
ation, skewness, and kurtosis of the experimental stimulus distributions.
To check whether our manipulation to create the experimental stimulus
distributions changed the character of the mathematical distributions, we
applied a Wilcoxon signed{ranks test. Table 2 shows us that the hypothesis
of identity cannot be rejected.
Insert Table 2 about here.
4.3 Procedure
As a warm{up introduction, subjects were rst shown 25 values taken from
the mathematical distributions. Then the 42 values of the experimental
design were presented to the subjects in a random order, rst as a synopsis,
and then one at a time. Subjects were asked to assign them to one of the
categories excellent, good, sucient, barely sucient, insucient, bad, very
6We started at 135 UFOs, and formed the sequence using a distance of 64 (in two cases
63) UFOs.
10bad. After that, all stimuli were again shown together with the subject's
categorization. Subjects were asked to conrm or change their categorization
assignment. Thereafter, subjects were asked to provide limens of the seven
income categories.
The experiment was administered from April 24, 2001, to May 5, 2001, at
the Laboratorio Informatico, Department of Economics, University of Bari,
Italy. 250 subjects participated in this experiment, 50 for each of the ve
distributions. Subjects were only admitted to a single participation. Each
subject received a lump{sum reimbursement of 15,000 Italian Lire (about 7.5
EURO. Subjects spent between 6 and 43 minutes to complete the experiment
(mean: 16.1 minutes, standard deviation: 6.2).
5 Results
Comparing subjects' primary and revised category assignments we found
them to be not signicantly dierent. This allowed us to use only the revised
assignments of categories for our analyses.
5.1 Background Context Matters
Table 3 contains the mean () and median (M) assignments of the 14 com-
mon stimuli to the seven categories, coded from 1 (very bad) to 7 (excellent).
The table shows that the subjects actually exhausted the categories irrespec-
tive of the distribution of stimuli because the categories coincide for the tails
(135 UFOs and 965 UFOs, respectively).
Insert Table 3 about here.
11For our experiment, testing on background{context eects is equivalent
to testing on whether the ve sets of observations have the same underlying
distribution for a given stimulus income. That is, the null hypothesis for













ns(z) 8 z 2 R ;
where un=uniform, no=normal, bi=bimodal, ps=positively{skewed,
ns=negatively{skewed. Since neither normality nor cardinality of the ob-
servations hold, we use the (non{parametric) Kruskal{Wallis (KW) test in
order to test on background{context eects. The results (2 values and sig-
nicance levels p) of this test for each of the 14 common stimuli are given in
the last two columns of the table.
For the interior common stimuli (191{901 UFOs), we observe considerable
background context eects: The respective Kruskal{Wallis tests are signi-
cant at the 1% level, except for the 454 UFOs stimulus which is signicant
at the 10% level. That is, for 12 of 14 tests performed, we have to reject
the null hypothesis that the ve dierent sets of observations came from
the same distribution. Assuming stochastic independence of the 14 observa-
tions (per subject) under the null hypothesis,7 a supplementary binomial test
would strongly reject the null hypothesis that this results from pure chance
(p = :006).
This subsection demonstrates that background context matters for in-
come categorization. Our test was global in the sense that it did not allow
pairwise comparisons. In the next subsection, we are concerned with a di-
rectional hypothesis.
7This assumption is, of course, not unproblematic.
125.2 Relative Deprivation
The gures in Table 3 show a clear tendency: The positively{skewed distri-
bution by and large exhibits the highest mean assignments, followed by the
bimodal distribution, and the uniform and the normal distributions. Un-
der the negatively{skewed distribution, subjects' categorization of incomes
turns out worst. Take, for example, the 773 UFOs category: The dier-
ence between the positively{skewed and the negatively{skewed distributions
amounts to no less than 0:84 categories.
Consequently, we hypothesize that identical income stimuli are perceived
to belong to higher evaluation categories if the background context shifts
more income mass to lower income brackets or, the other way round, if the
background context exhibits more income mass concentrated among higher
income strata, then the evaluation of identical income stimuli is downgraded
(relative deprivation). In order to test on relative deprivation, we com-
pute Spearman's rank correlations between the subjects' categorizations of a
stimulus and the number of incomes larger than that stimulus as a measure
of relative deprivation. Note that, if alternative measures of relative depri-
vation such as the sum of incomes exceeding the stimulus etc. are applied,
results do not change qualitatively.
Insert Table 4 about here.






k are independent ;
13where Xk and Y k denote the distributions of the categorizations of stimulus
k and the corresponding number of incomes larger than the stimulus (see
Table 4), respectively. As can be taken from Table 4, the null hypothesis of
independence is rejected for 11 of 14 tests at the 5% signicance level and
for 12 of 14 test at the 10% signicance level. Furthermore, all signicant
correlations exhibit the right, negative, sign. Again, a binomial test would
strongly conrm that this does not result from pure chance (p = :006).
Hence, we conclude that relative deprivation is an important factor in
the evaluation of incomes: The more incomes exist which exceed the income
to be evaluated, that is, the greater the relative deprivation associated with
this income is, the worse is this income's categorization for the respective
background.
5.3 Range{Frequency Theory
In order to test the empirical performance of range{frequency theory in the
















where the judgment of stimulus i under income distribution k is given by
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k denotes an intercept term, wk
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F denote the weights of the range
and the frequency components, respectively, and uk
i is an error term.
Using equation (5), we can test three postulates of range{frequency the-
ory: The rst postulate requires the intercept term k to equal zero (neu-
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and the third postulate demands that the weights must be nonnegative (if
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Furthermore, we can also test on whether dierent distributions of income
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in addition to (5) and compute the respective F tests. Background{context
dependence is tested by means of a pooled sample and dummy variables.
Note that we did not run any regressions for the uniform distribution since
range and frequency values coincide [the numerator of the range equation (1)
becomes exactly Fi times the denominator of (1)].
Table 5 contains the estimates of the weights using OLS. For every distri-
bution of income stimuli, the table compares the restricted (above) with the
unrestricted regression (below). The model summary shows a much better
t of the unrestricted model. Hence, the F test (last column) strongly rejects
15the null hypothesis of additivity, that is, the restriction wF = (1   wR) does
not hold. In all 4 cases, the sum of the estimated coecients for Ri and Fi
slightly exceeds 1.8 Hence, we focus our attention on the unrestricted model
in the following.
Insert Table 5 about here.
With the exception of the positively{skewed distribution, the intercept
terms are insignicant as maintained by the neutrality hypothesis. The in-
tercept term of the positively{skewed distribution exhibits a negative sign.
This means that a positively{skewed distribution of stimuli biases subjects'
categorizations of incomes downwards. That is, although relative deprivation
is lowest and, thus, income categorizations are highest under the positively{
skewed income distribution, a (relatively small) premium is attached to the
judgment function of the positively{skewed income distribution. This result
is possibly due to an endowment eect [Tversky and Grin (1991, p. 117]
caused by the relatively low mean income of the positively{skewed income
distribution.
Except for the normal distribution, the estimated weights of the range
and the frequency components are inside the unit interval, that is, the non-
negativity hypothesis cannot be rejected. The weight of the range component
amounts to about 0.8, that is, distinctly more weight is given to the range
component than to the frequency component. With regard to the normal
distribution, we observe a weight of the range component larger than 1.
Computing the t value for the null hypothesis wR   1 = 0 shows, however,
8This contradicts, a result obtained by Parducci et al. (1960, p. 75).
16that wR does not dier signicantly from 1. On the other hand, the frequency
component does not matter at all for the categorization of incomes.
Eventually, we ran an (unrestricted) pooled regression with the positively{
skewed distribution as the benchmark case and dummies for the dierential
intercepts and slopes of the other distributions in order to test on background
context. The adjusted R2 of this regression is :935 (F = 3645, p  :01). As
compared to the positively{skewed income distribution, the intercept terms
of the normal, the bimodal, and the negatively{skewed distributions are sig-
nicantly larger (the t values are between 2.090 and 2.863; p  :05) which
conrms that the neutrality hypothesis is rejected only for the positively{
skewed income distribution, whose mean income is lowest. Moreover, the
pooled regression conrms that the range component is given a signicantly
greater and the frequency component a signicantly smaller weight, respec-
tively, under the normal distribution (the t values are 2.081 and  2:576,
respectively; p  :05). That is, the shape of the normal distribution seems
to induce subjects to categorize the stimulus incomes by range alone. The
dierences between the weights of the bimodal, the positively{skewed, and
the negatively{skewed distributions are not signicant [bimodal vs. positively
skewed: t =  :345, p = :723 (range), t = :203, p = :839 (frequency); neg-
atively vs. positively skewed: t =  1:132, p = :258 (range), t = 1:181,
p = :238 (frequency)]. For these three income distributions, the structural
part of income categorization in terms of the weights entering the judgment
function is equal and independent of the shape of the income distribution to
be judged. In other words, under the bimodal, the positively{skewed, and
the negatively{skewed income distribution background context matters for
the categorization of incomes but not for the judgment function itself.
Summarizing, we nd, rst, the neutrality hypothesis of range{frequency
17theory violated for the positively{skewed income distribution but not for
the other income distributions. Second, additivity is violated for all income
distributions considered. The component weights are slightly super{additive.
The estimates demonstrate that, third, the weights are within the interval
[0;1] and, fourth, not signicantly dierent for the negatively{skewed, the
positively{skewed, and the bimodal income distributions but, fth, far o
from values around w = 0:5 estimated (and sometimes merely assumed) by
psychologists (for example, Parducci et al. 1960, p. 74; Parducci and Perrett
1971, p. 429; Birnbaum 1974a, p. 92). Instead, the weight of the frequency
component is much smaller, being close to :2.
Two reasons can account for the low weight of the frequency component.
Firstly, Harris' (1993) conjecture can have something in it. Using incomes
instead of ratings could have moved subjects' behavior closer to the linear
model. However, relying on real monetary values, Mellers (1986) observed
pronounced curvatures of the judgment functions in her work on equitalbe
taxes. Also Parducci et al. (1960) and Birnbaum (1974a) found distict cur-
vatures of the judgment functions of experiments on a size categorization of
numerals which ranged within the interval from 108 to 992 (similar to the
support of the income distributions used for our experiment).
Secondly, recall that Mellers (1982, 1986) winnowed out the subjects with
Aristotelian equity values (who endorsed proportionality for distributive jus-
tice). This comes up to the elimination of all subjects who behaved in con-
formity with the range component only. This had somewhat increased the
inuence of the frequency component.
185.4 Income Satisfaction versus Well{Being: A Para-
dox
Whereas psychologists construct the graphs of the judgment functions or
the category assignment functions for the common stimuli only, using the
mean category assignments as exhibited in Table 3, we construct the graphs
of the judgment functions for all 42 stimulus values using the estimates of
the unrestricted weights of the range and the frequency components. The
respective graphs are shown in Figure 1.
Insert Figure 1 about here.
This gure conrms the message conveyed by the entries in Table 3: The
graph of the judgment function of the positively{skewed income distribution
exhibits a concave shape and dominates all other judgment functions up to
incomes of about 800 UFOs. The graph of the judgment function of the
negatively{skewed income distribution exhibits a convex shape and is dom-
inated by all other judgment functions over the whole interval of stimulus
incomes. For the judgment functions of the normal and the bimodal income
distributions we observe linear and S{shaped graphs, respectively. The latter
two intersect several times, and lie for most incomes between the graphs of
the judgments functions of the positively{skewed and the negatively{skewed
income distributions. For incomes above about 800 UFOs the graph of the
judgment function of the bimodal income distributions dominates all other in-
come distributions. Thus, a positively{skewed income distributions generates
the highest income satisfaction for small and moderate incomes. Concerning
19the top incomes, the highest income satisfaction is conveyed by a bimodal in-
come distribution. Under a negatively{skewed income distribution, personal
income satisfaction turns out to be lowest. These observations are perfectly
in line with our previous result that a positively{skewed income distribution
generates less relative deprivation than a negatively{skewed one.
Notice that income satisfaction is inverse to the means of the distribu-
tions. Mean income is highest for the negatively{skewed distribution, yet
income satisfaction is lowest. For the positively{skewed distribution, the
mean income is lowest, yet income satisfaction is highest. The mean income
of the other three distributions is not much dierent among them and lies in
between, as does by and large income satisfaction. Does this imply that the
positively{skewed income distributions, which prevail in the real world, are
able to elicit the highest income satisfaction from a given aggregate income?
Our experiment even suggests that the negatively{skewed distribution elicits
the minimum individual income satisfaction from the maximum total income.
However, greater individual income satisfaction does not necessarily im-
ply a higher level of well{being or social welfare within the respective society.
Rather do we have to aggregate the individual welfare of the income recip-
ients. Applying a Harsanyi-type social welfare function, we sum individual
income satisfaction from below and divide the partial sums by the number







Accordingly, the graph of  W shows average social welfare for all income
recipients disposing of an income of yi or less. Figure 2 graphically depicts
the average well{being of the society under dierent income distributions.
20Insert Figure 2 about here.
Figure 2 shows that average well{being is highest under a bimodal income
distribution for those income recipients who do not dispose of more than
about 400 UFOs. If we consider also better incomes between 400 and 800
UFOs, then the Utopians are best o with a normal income distribution.
Eventually, if we take into account the top earners as well, the negatively{
skewed income distribution generates greatest average well{being.
Comparing the graphs of the judgment functions and average well{being
of the positively{skewed and the negatively{skewed income distributions, we
strike a paradoxical situation: Under a positively{skewed income distribu-
tion every single income recipient, even the top earners, experiences higher
individual income satisfaction than under a negatively{skewed income distri-
bution; yet, for each stratied subset of subjects, average well{being under
a negatively{skewed income distribution exceeds average well{being under a
positively{skewed income distribution.
This is akin to an observation made by Camacho{Cuena, Seidl, and Mo-
rone (2002). When subjects had to assess income distributions as a whole
from under a veil of ignorance, they seem to pay attention to all possible in-
comes to which they may be attributed within an income distribution. This
aects their ratings of income distributions: Even for income distributions
with identical means, negatively{skewed distributions are rated distinctly
higher than positively{skewed distributions, possibly because they oer the
better chance to end up at a comparatively satisfactory income level.9
9For ample experimental evidence see Camacho{Cuena, Seidl, and Morone (2002), who
observed also a preference reversal phenomenon [cf. Seidl (2002)] between the rating and
the evaluation of income distributions. For the context of the present paper, categorization
215.5 Pattern of Limens
After subjects had categorized the 14 stimulus incomes, they were told that,
for the purpose of future use in Utopia's statistical oce, they should state
limens for the seven income categories. Moreover, they were told that the
limens should properly reect the income distribution prevailing in Utopia.
Note that subjects were not forced to express consistent behavior in the sense
that the upper limen of of a category had to be equal to the lower limen of
the following category.10
We observed only one category overlap11, but several empty intervals
between category limens.12 What might have prompted subjects to behave
in this way? They are too many to explain their behavior simply by error,
even more so as these subjects made their responses without overlaps between
limens, but empty intervals between them. Therefore, it seems as if these
subjects took our question under the proviso of making entirely unambiguous
statements such as: \An income between 405 and 506 UFOs is certainly
insucient. But for incomes between 331 and 404 UFOs I am not entirely
of incomes is more akin to rating than to evaluation. Beckman, Formby, Smith, and Zheng
(2002) observed less opposition to Pareto-improving moves of income distributions when
subjects make their judgments under a veil of ignorance. For known positions, opposition
against extra income is highest for income gains of persons in a higher income echelon,
less for persons in a lower income echelon, and least for own extra income. This nding
matches with our results for individual income satisfaction in the present paper.
10This is in contrast to the surveys of the Leyden school, where subjects could indicate
only one of these two gures.
11This one instance seems to be an error because this same subject exhibited empty
intervals for the other categories.
12Among our 50 subjects per distribution, we observed 12 subjects with empty inter-
vals for the uniform distribution, 10 for the symmetric distribution, 11 for the bimodal
distribution, 9 for the positively{skewed distribution, and 14 for the negatively{skewed
distribution.
22sure whether they are still bad or already insucient. Likewise, for incomes
between 507 and 598 UFOs, I am not entirely sure whether they are still
insucient. Therefore, to be on the safe side, I make statements only for
those areas for which I am entirely condent."13
Insert Table 6 about here.
Table 6 lists the means () and medians (M) of the lower and upper
limens of the seven income categories for the ve income distributions. In
analogy to Table 3, the test on background context eects with respect to
income categorization, the Kruskal{Wallis test (see the last two columns of
Table 6), shows that background context matters. For 9 of the 12 tests
conducted, the null hypothesis of the 5 sets of observations coming from the
same distributions has to be rejected (p  :10).
Comparing Table 6 with Table 3 and conning ourselves to the mid-
dle limens (from \bad" to \sucient"), we see that the negatively{skewed
distribution of stimuli, which exhibits the lowest category assignments and,
therefore, income satisfaction, in Table 3, exhibits the highest limens in Table
6. It is followed rather indiscriminately by the uniform and the symmetric
distributions which ranks third in Table 3, and then by the bimodal distribu-
tion, which occupies rank two in Table 3. The positively{skewed distribution
of stimuli, which exhibits the highest category assignments in Table 2, shows
13Obviously Birnbaum (1974a) had anticipated such an attitude. Wisely, he asked his
subjects only for their \typical numbers" for each category. Indeed, if in everyday life
one asks subjects for sucient incomes, one often gets a representative income level as an
answer rather than an income interval.
23the lowest limens in Table 6. Thus, the ordering of the limens corresponds by
and large with the category assignments; subjects behaved consistently for
both sides of the medal. This reects again the inuence of the background
context on the perception of income limens for the calibration of categories.
If the background context exhibits more income mass concentrated among
the higher income brackets, subjects become more exacting, which shifts the
limens of income categorization in the direction of higher incomes. However,
if more income mass is concentrated among the lower income brackets, sub-
jects become more humble as to income categorization, that is, categorial
limens are shifted in the direction of lower incomes. Background context
of stimuli matters also with respect to the perception of limens of income
categorization.
This shows that limen setting reects relative deprivation: Limens are
higher the more incomes are ahead of the limen incomes. On the other hand,
inspection of Tables 6 and A1 reveals that the total income level, too, matters.
A modest endowment eect is, therefore, also at work. Higher income levels
are capable of compensating for enduring more better{o income recipients,
which constitutes the second inuence on limen setting.
6 Conclusion
This paper uses the data gained from an income categorization experiment to
investigate background context eects, relative deprivation, range{frequency
theory to explain background context eects, individual income satisfaction
versus aggregate well{being, and the dual patterns of income categorization
and limen setting.
Five groups of 50 subjects were asked to assign 14 common income stim-
24uli to seven income categories. These common stimuli were embedded in 28
adventitious stimuli to form ve dierent income distributions, uniform, nor-
mal, bimodal, positively{skewed, and negatively{skewed. Each distribution
was presented to a group of subjects.
Firstly, we found that background context matters. Using a Kruskal{
Wallis test, we had to reject the hypothesis that the ve dierent sets of
observations of income categorization came from the same distribution. This
means that the background of the 28 adventitious income stimuli had inu-
enced income categorization.
Secondly, we investigated the direction of background context eects,
which led us to discover that relative deprivation is at work to shape the pat-
tern of background context. Spearman's rank correlations between income
categorization and the number of incomes ahead of the respective stimuli
shows a signicantly positive relationship. Thus, identical income stimuli
are perceived to belong to higher evaluation categories if the background
context shifts more income mass to lower income brackets, or, the other way
round, if the background context exhibits more income mass concentrated
among higher income strata, then the evaluation of identical income stimuli
is downgraded.
Thirdly, background context eects have been explained by means of
range{frequency theory, which posits that the categorization of a stimu-
lus is a weighted mean of this stimulus' range and frequency component.
We found that neutrality is violated for the positively{skewed distribution,
which reects the working of a modest endowment eect. Furthermore, the
weights are slightly super{additive and nonnegative. The frequency compo-
nent is ruled out for the normal distribution. For the negatively{skewed,
the positively{skewed, and the bimodal income distributions, the weight of
25the frequency component is about .2 and not signicantly dierent for the
negatively{skewed, the positively{skewed, and the bimodal income distri-
butions. This result is remarkable, because for the negatively{skewed, the
positively{skewed, and the bimodal income distributions background context
matters for the categorization of incomes, but not for the judgment function
itself.
Fourthly, we struck a paradox between individual income satisfaction and
aggregate well{being. Whereas the judgment functions show that individual
income satisfaction is highest for the positively skewed income distribution
and lowest for the negatively skewed income distribution, a Harsanyi{type
social welfare function demonstrates that average aggregate well{being is
for all stratied subsets of subjects higher for the negatively skewed income
distribution than for the positively skewed income distribution. This paradox
results from the weighting of income satisfaction with the frequency of the
involved subjects.
Finally, we found that limen setting of income categories provides a pic-
ture which is perfectly consistent with income categorization. This demon-
strates that response{mode eects are absent for experiments on income
categorization on the one hand, and limen setting on the other.
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32Tables
Table 1 Descriptive Statistics of Experimental Distributions
Parameters for
generation
Moments of experimental distri-
butions
Distribution   Mean Std.dev. Skewn. Kurt.
Uniform (550) (260) 550 258 .000  1:200
Normal 550 230 549 198 .000  :544
Bimodala 325, 775 100 550 241 .000  1:479
Positively{skewedb 6 1 408 230 .738  :349
Negatively{skewedc 6 1 692 230  :735  :348
Table note. All distributions truncated at 100 on the left and at 1000 on
the right.
aMixture of two normal densities.
bLognormal density.
cLognormal density with x  = 1100   x.
33Table 2 Test on Equality of Math-









Table note. Z statistic and signicance
level (p) of the Wilcoxon signed{ranks
test. n = 42.
34Table 3 Test on Background Context Eects | Kruskal{Wallis (KW) test
Uniform Normal Bimodal Pos.{sk. Neg.{sk. KW test
Stim.  M  M  M  M  M 2 p
135 1.06 1 1.04 1 1.10 1 1.00 1 1.06 1 5.334 .255
199 1.38 1 1.18 1 1.36 1 1.48 1 1.14 1 13.399 .009
263 2.02 2 1.98 2 2.00 2 2.24 2 1.76 2 23.966 .000
327 2.42 2 2.40 2 2.56 3 2.78 3 2.28 2 21.353 .000
390 2.84 3 2.80 3 2.76 3 3.10 3 2.46 2 32.927 .000
454 3.48 4 3.26 3 3.44 3 3.58 4 3.24 3 8.624 .071
518 3.80 4 3.96 4 4.04 4 4.16 4 3.82 4 15.288 .004
582 4.12 4 4.16 4 4.16 4 4.42 4 3.86 4 27.036 .000
646 4.46 5 4.76 5 4.74 5 4.88 5 4.24 4 45.872 .000
710 5.24 5 5.10 5 5.40 5 5.46 5 4.78 5 31.661 .000
773 5.46 5.5 5.56 6 5.68 6 5.80 6 4.96 5 40.838 .000
837 6.04 6 6.02 6 6.32 6 6.18 6 5.92 6 18.646 .001
901 6.76 7 6.54 7 7.00 7 6.92 7 6.86 7 16.377 .003
965 6.96 7 6.98 7 7.00 7 7.00 7 6.98 7 4.065 .397
Table note.  =mean, M =median. n = 50  5, df = 4 for all tests.
3
5Table 4 Test on Relative Deprivation




Stim. un no bi ps ns rs p
135 40 41 41 39 41 .100 .116
199 37 40 40 33 40 -.183 .004
263 34 38 36 27 39 -.277 .000
327 31 35 31 22 38 -.274 .000
390 28 32 26 18 36 -.298 .000
454 25 28 23 15 34 -.171 .007
518 22 23 21 12 32 -.188 .003
582 19 18 20 9 29 -.274 .000
646 16 13 18 7 26 -.359 .000
710 13 9 15 5 23 -.262 .000
773 10 5 10 3 18 -.353 .000
837 7 3 5 2 14 -.122 .055
901 4 1 1 1 8 -.183 .004
965 1 0 0 0 2 -.044 .491
Table note. un=uniform, no=normal,
bi=bimodal, ps=positively{skewed,
ns=negatively{skewed. n = 250 for all
tests.
aSpearman's rank correlation between the
number of incomes larger than the stimulus
and the categorization of that stimulus.
36Table 5 OLS Estimation of Weights
Coecients 95% CI wR Model summary Test on
 wR wF 95% CI wF F a R2 additivityb
Normal distribution
**.010 **.939 (.061) [:853;1:025] 460.986 .398
.003 .044 | .000
-.001 **1.034 -.012 [:895;1:173] 5814.075 .943 6664.298
.007 .071 .061 [ :131;:108] .000 .000
Bimodal distribution
**.019 **.765 (.235) [:612;:918] 96.151 .121
.003 .078 | .000
.004 **.823 **.206 [:665;:981] 5357.242 .939 9346.656
.006 .080 .078 [:052;:359] .000 .000
Positively{skewed distribution
-.001 **.850 (.150) [:777;:923] 523.337 .428
.006 .037 | .000
**-.028 **.855 **.187 [:783;:927] 5658.250 .942 6176.862
.009 .037 .038 [:112;:262] .000 .000
Negatively{skewed distribution
*.015 **.783 (.217) [:692;:874] 284.062 .289
.008 .046 | .000
-.002 **.791 **.256 [:701;:882] 3717.255 .914 5065.407
.009 .046 .047 [:163;:348] .000 .000
Table note. n = 700. *p  :10, **p  :05; tested against 0. Above:
restricted model; below: unrestricted model. Standard errors in italics.
aFirst row: F value, second row: signicance level.
bF value and signicance level.
37Table 6 Limens Under Dierent Income Distributions | Kruskal{Wallis (KW) Test
Uniform Normal Bimodal Pos.{sk. Neg.{sk. KW test
Category Limen  M  M  M  M  M 2 p
Very bad Low (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) (100) | |
Up 200 199 204 200 190 200 188 195 205 200 4.230 .376
Bad Low 219 200 213 200 201 200 196 200 212 200 3.535 .473
Up 338 310 339 350 335 310 311 300 352 355 12.129 .016
Insucient Low 343 332 343 350 335 311 313 301 363 400 14.251 .007
Up 468 450 468 473 452 450 430 427 472 500 13.031 .011
Barely sucient Low 473 456 470 473 457 455 431 428 482 500 14.552 .006
Up 599 600 603 600 586 600 565 599 609 605 13.021 .011
Sucient Low 607 601 604 600 588 600 570 600 619 646 14.878 .005
Up 726 750 733 750 704 700 700 700 750 770 21.998 .000
Good Low 736 750 733 750 707 701 707 705 755 781 21.117 .000
Up 859 864 856 880 841 850 853 864 862 895 5.834 .212
Excellent Low 876 898 867 893 851 850 865 877 880 900 8.062 .089
Up (965) (965) (965) (965) (965) (965) (965) (965) (965) (965) | |
Table note.  =mean, M =median. n = 50  5, df = 4 for all tests.
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Figure 1 Graphs of Judgment Functions
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Figure 2 Average Well{Being Under Dierent Income Distributions
40Appendix
Instructions and Stimulus Material
Income evaluation in Utopia14
Suppose you live in the future and participate in a space shuttle ight to
the planet Utopia, which is inhabited by small green individuals. The local
currency in Utopia is the UFO.
Suppose further that each small green individual bears on his or her chest
a visible identication card, which (among other information) also shows his
or her income. Utopia's constitution states that the lowest allowable income
is 100 UFOs, while the upper income ceiling is 1000 UFOs: nobody must earn
less than 100 UFOs, and nobody must earn more than 1000 UFOs. Consider
that 100 UFOs is beyond the survival income level and that more income is
always preferable.
After your landing on Utopia, you walk around in Utopia's capital, called
Haley, and observe the income of several subjects.
Then 25 values taken from the true mathematical distribution
of the respective group were shown in a random order to allow
subjects to become acquainted with the experimental procedure.
After your short trip through Haley, you meet Utopia's Prime Minister
who had invited you to consult him with respect to an important issue: As
you are an economist (a species completely unknown in Utopia), the Prime
Minister asks you to make an evaluation of the incomes earned in Utopia. He
wants you to categorize the incomes earned in Utopia into seven categories,
viz.:








In order to perform this job properly, the Prime Minister presents to you
a booklet containing a random sample of the incomes of 42 income recipients.
You are assured that this sample is a perfect representation of the income
distribution in Utopia.
In the following you can see the 42 entries of this booklet.
Now 42 values of the respective experimental distribution were
shown in random order. First, the whole set of values was shown
on the monitor and thereafter all entries were shown one at a
time (in the very same order) and subjects were asked to assign
them to one of the above categories. After all values had been
assigned to categories, subjects were shown all values together
with their categorization and could either conrm or change their
categorization. Both the prior and posterior categorizations were
recorded.
The Prime Minister is quite happy with your categorization of incomes,
which enables him to gain insights into the social stratication of Utopia.
For future use of Utopia's statistical oce, he asks you to state also limens
for the seven income categories (notice that there is no ination in Utopia).
42For this purpose, he gives you a questionnaire and asks you to ll it in. Your
limens should properly reect the income distribution prevailing in Utopia.
A green individual's income is
very bad if it is less than UFOs
bad if it is between and UFOs
insucient if it is between and UFOs
barely sucient if it is between and UFOs
sucient if it is between and UFOs
good if it is between and UFOs
excellent if it is higher than UFOs
After this, your task is done. The Prime Minister thanks you and awards
you the Utopian Order of the Garter in return for your services to his planet.
43Table A1 Stimuli of the Experiment
Mathematical Experimental
# un no bi ps ns un no bi ps ns
1 121 165 167 111 162 121 135 135 111 135
2 142 209 199 121 216 135 199 199 121 199
3 163 243 221 132 265 163 243 221 135 263
4 184 272 239 143 310 184 263 239 143 327
5 205 296 254 153 351 199 296 254 153 351
6 226 319 269 164 388 226 319 263 164 390
7 247 339 282 174 423 247 327 282 174 423
8 267 357 294 185 455 263 357 294 185 454
9 288 375 306 196 485 288 375 306 199 485
10 309 391 317 207 513 309 390 317 207 518
11 330 407 329 218 539 327 407 327 218 539
12 351 422 340 229 564 351 422 340 229 564
13 372 437 352 241 587 372 437 352 241 582
14 393 451 364 253 609 390 454 364 253 609
15 414 465 377 265 630 414 465 377 263 630
16 435 478 391 278 650 435 478 390 278 646
17 456 492 406 291 669 454 492 406 291 669
18 477 505 424 304 687 477 505 424 304 687
19 498 518 444 318 705 498 518 454 318 710
20 519 530 472 333 721 518 530 472 327 721
21 540 543 516 347 737 540 543 518 347 737
Table continues.
44Continuation of Table A1
Mathematical Experimental
# un no bi ps ns un no bi ps ns
22 560 556 583 363 753 560 556 582 363 753
23 581 569 627 379 767 582 569 627 379 767
24 602 581 655 395 782 602 582 646 390 773
25 623 594 675 413 796 623 594 675 413 796
26 644 607 693 431 809 646 607 693 431 809
27 665 621 708 450 822 665 621 710 454 822
28 686 634 722 470 835 686 634 722 470 837
29 707 648 735 491 847 710 646 735 491 847
30 728 662 747 513 859 728 662 747 518 859
31 749 677 759 536 871 749 677 759 536 871
32 770 692 770 561 882 773 692 773 561 882
33 791 708 782 587 893 791 710 782 582 893
34 793 724 793 615 904 812 724 793 615 901
35 833 742 805 645 915 837 742 805 646 915
36 853 760 817 677 926 853 760 817 677 926
37 874 780 830 712 936 874 773 837 710 936
38 895 803 845 749 947 901 803 845 749 947
39 916 827 860 790 957 916 837 860 773 957
40 937 856 878 835 968 937 856 878 837 965
41 958 890 900 884 979 965 901 901 901 979
42 979 934 932 938 989 979 965 965 965 989
Table note. un=uniform, no=normal, bi=bimodal,
ps=positively{skewed, ns=negatively{skewed.
45